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Abstract: The size and complexity of industrial chemical plants, together with the nature of
the products handled, means that an analysis and control of the risks involved is required.
This paper presents a methodology for risk analysis in chemical and allied industries that is based on
a combination of HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP) and a quantitative analysis of the most
relevant risks through the development of fault trees, fault tree analysis (FTA). Results from FTA allow
prioritizing the preventive and corrective measures to minimize the probability of failure. An analysis
of a case study is performed; it consists in the terminal for unloading chemical and petroleum
products, and the fuel storage facilities of two companies, in the port of Valencia (Spain). HAZOP
analysis shows that loading and unloading areas are the most sensitive areas of the plant and where
the most significant danger is a fuel spill. FTA analysis indicates that the most likely event is a fuel
spill in tank truck loading area. A sensitivity analysis from the FTA results show the importance of
the human factor in all sequences of the possible accidents, so it should be mandatory to improve
the training of the staff of the plants.
Keywords: risk; HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP); Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); fuel; storage
1. Introduction
Technological and social development has led to an increase in the size and complexity of chemical
plants. At the same time, the existence of such plants and the transport of their products involve
certain risks that need to be controlled and minimised [1,2].
Risk is understood as the possibility that someone or something is adversely affected by
a hazard [3], while danger is defined as any unsafe situation or potential source of an undesirable
and damaging event [4]. Other definitions of risk are the measure of the severity of a hazard [5],
or the measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects [6].
In recent decades, interest in the safety of chemical industrial plants has greatly increased [2,7].
This has led to the development of a scientific discipline known as process safety that focuses on
the prevention of fires, explosions, and accidental chemical releases in chemical processing facilities [8].
This discipline has as objective to improve prevention in the facilities, learning from accidents and
from continuous analysis of the production process.
Directive 2012/18/EU (or Seveso III) [9] defines as a serious accident an event (such as a major
leak, fire, or explosion) resulting from an uncontrolled process during the operation of any plant and
producing a serious danger, whether immediate or delayed, to human health or the environment, inside
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or outside the plant, and involving one or more hazardous substances. Examples of serious accidents
in industrial processes include: Flixborough in Britain (1974), Seveso in Italy (1976), Bhopal in India
(1984), Enschede in the Netherlands (2000), Toulouse in France (2001) and Buncefield in Britain
(2005) [10–15]. In Spain, examples include an accident at the Repsol refinery in Puertollano (2003)
in which an explosion in a gas storage area killed nine workers and injured many others, as well as
causing property damage.
The complexity and severity of accidents at these plants requires the implementation of risk
management systems. The ISO 31000: 2010 [16] standard defines risk management as “coordinated
activities to manage and control an organisation with regard to risk” and comprises the following steps:
communication and consultation, establishing the context, risk assessment (identification, analysis,
and evaluation), risk treatment, monitoring, and review.
The purpose of this article is to show the procedure for risk analysis in chemical and allied
industries that is based on a combination of HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP) and
a quantitative analysis of the most relevant risks through the development of fault trees, fault tree
analysis (FTA). HAZOP can identify possible fault root causes and their consequences and FTA
develops fault propagation pathways and provides a quantitative probability importance ranking of
fault causes. These results can guide the decision making of management staff to mitigate or avoid
potential process hazards. This working method is applied to a case study consisting of the terminal
for unloading chemical and petroleum products, and the fuel storage facilities of two companies,
in the port of Valencia (Spain).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the theme. Section 2 introduces the main
data of the chemical industry in Spain and the framework for risk assessment process of major
accidents. Section 3 introduces the methodology. Section 4 details a case study with the HAZOP
and FTA analysis. Section 5 presents the conclusions. Appendixs A–D present complementary
documentation of case study.
2. The Chemical Industry in Spain and Serious Accidents
2.1. The Chemical Industry in Spain
Turnover of the chemical industry in Spain totalled €56.39 billion in 2014, representing 12.4%
of industrial Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [17] and making the industry the fourth largest after
the food, transport and metal industries. This is also the second largest sector of the Spanish economy
in terms of exports with 58.1% of sales going abroad.
The largest concentration of chemical companies is found in Catalonia with 43% of total turnover,
followed by Andalusia (12.7%) and Madrid (13.5%). The Valencian Community is in fourth place with
€4.88 billion or 8.4% of total turnover. The chemical sector employed 191,100 people in 2008, a figure
that has fallen to around 174,600 in recent years because of the economic crisis [17].
The Spanish Chemical Industry Federation (FEIQUE) in its 2015 annual report on industrial
accidents in the chemical sector [18] noted that the frequency index was 3.44 (the index frequency
represents the number of accidents for every million hours worked). Compared with data published
by the Ministry of Employment in 2015, this index is lower than the industrial sector index (5.03) and
the construction sector index (6.59). The severity index for the sector was 0.12 (the severity index
represents the number of days lost per 1000 working hours), which reflects the great importance that
is given to safety in the Spanish chemical industry.
2.2. The Regulatory Framework
The disastrous accident at Seveso (Italy) in 1976 led to European Union legislation intended
to prevent accidents in certain industries using hazardous substances and thus limit the impact on
employees, the general population, and on the environment. The resulting standard was Directive
82/501/EEC [19] better known as Seveso I. This regulatory framework established that a manufacturer
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company which used in their process hazardous substances listed in the Appendix A or stored
hazardous substances listed in the Appendix B, or both, must develop (among other documents)
interior and exterior protection and emergency plans that include risk assessment.
During the implementation of Seveso I, there were more than 130 serious accidents in Europe
and new risks appeared due to technological advances. Consequently, the European Commission
introduced Directive 96/82/EC (called Directive Seveso II) [20] in 1996. This directive classified plants
into “not affected”, “low risk” and “high risk” according to the quantities of dangerous substances
present. Seveso II was revised in Directive 2012/18/EU or Seveso III [9] with the aim of increasing
levels of protection for people, property, and the environment.
In Spain, in 2016, according to data from the Directorate General for Civil Defence [21],
there were 422 high risk plants subject to the Seveso directive and 470 low risk plants. The geographical
distribution is similar to that for turnover: Catalonia was first with 101 high risk plants (23.9%),
Andalusia with 70 (16.6%), the Valencian Community with 39 (9.2%) and the Basque Country with
28 (6.6%).
According to a study by Planas et al. [2], there have been 89 accidents in Spain since the beginning
of the twentieth century. Some 44% of these accidents occurred during transport, the most serious
accident occurring at Los Alfaques campsite in July 1978 where 217 people died. The second major
source of accidents were processing areas (19%); and the third source were storage areas. Explosions
occurred in 49% of accidents, leaks in 37% and fires in 24%.
The chemical industry has implemented improvements in process safety and environmental
protection with four strategies: inherent safer design; risk assessment processes; use of instrumented
safety systems; and the implementation of safety management systems. In the risk assessment
process, the HAZOP method is the technique most used to identify risks [2]. HAZOP studies
evolved from the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) as a “Critical Examination” technique formulated
in the mid-1960s. One decade later, HAZOP was published formally as a disciplined procedure to
identify deviations to the process industries by Kletz in 1978 [22], and some publications [23], corporate
guidelines, standards (IEC 61882 [24]) and national guidance notes (Nota Técnica Prevención (NTP)
238 [25]) were developed after.
3. Methodology
Risk assessment is the process of identifying, analysing, and evaluating the hazard posed by
an industrial plant and the main aim is the prevention and mitigation of accidents in potentially
hazardous facilities [26,27].
The phase of hazard identification is the process in which hazards are identified and recorded.
The analysis phase involves developing an understanding of the hazard and providing information
for evaluation. The evaluation phase involves comparing the estimated hazard levels with predefined
criteria to define the importance of the level of hazard and decide whether it is necessary to address
the hazard—as well as the most appropriate strategies and methods of hazard treatment [8].
Choosing the appropriate risk assessment techniques is a difficult decision that will depend on
factors such as the complexity of the problem, the methods for analysis of the amount of information
available, the need for quantitative data, and available resources [28]. Often, authors combine some
techniques with the purpose of blending, i.e., to take advantage of the strengths of each method whilst
compensating for their weaknesses.
In this paper, the methodology used is based on the combination of HAZOP analysis and
a quantitative analysis of the most relevant hazards by FTA. HAZOP is a qualitative technique
that carries out a structured analysis of the process and allows identifying the deviations that may take
place with regard to the intended functioning, as well as their causes and consequences. HAZOP does
not try to provide quantitative results but, in many situations, it is necessary to rank the identified
hazards, mainly to prioritize the actions to mitigate them because this decision depends of the risk level.
For this purpose, HAZOP is combined with other techniques; in these cases, quantitative techniques
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such as FTA. It can identify the potential causes and the ways of failure and can assess quantitatively
the probability of development of the accident. The blending of the two techniques was defined as
positive because minimize the uncertainty [29–31].
There are many examples of blending HAZOP and FTA in the literature: Demichela et al. [32]
developed the Recursive Operability Analysis (ROA), linking HAZOP results and FTA development;
Cozzani et al. [33] developed a specific methodological approach to analyse the risk from hazardous
materials in marshalling yards; Casamirra et al. [34] integrated HAZOP, FTA and Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis (FMEA) to assess the safety of a hydrogen refuelling station; and Kim et al. [35]
combined HAZOP and FTA to carry out safety assessment of hydrogen fuelling stations at Korea.
The methodology (Figure 1) begins with a detailed study of the industrial process and substances
used. Subsequently, an historical analysis of accidents is made—which is the study and analysis
of accidents in similar plants to identify risk and causes. This stage is performed by referring to
specialised scientific publications and literature review. With this available information, a HAZOP
analysis is conducted. After the HAZOP sessions, the possible fault causes and consequences of
the given deviations from the design are identified. These data allow, according to the criteria of
the HAZOP team, identifying the initiating events, modelling the fault propagation process, and finally
building the fault tree analysis. Subsequently a quantitative analysis is performed and results obtained
rank risks and allow prioritizing the corrective and/or preventive measures.
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Figure 1. Methodology of study.
3.1. HAZOP Method
The HAZOP technique [36] is a structured and systematic examination of a product, process, or
procedure—or an existing or planned system. This is a qualitative technique based on the use of guide
words (Table 1) that question how design intent or operating conditions may fail to be achieved at
each step of the design process or technique. The guide words must always be appropriately selected
to the process which is analysed and additional guide words can be used.
This technique is applied by a multidisciplinary team during a series of meetings where work
areas and operations are defined—and each of the variables that influence the process are applied to
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the guide to verify the operating conditions and detect design errors or potentially abnormal operating
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Table 1. HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP) guide word method. Source: ISO 31010: 2011 [27].
Guide Word Meaning Example of Deviation
NO Absence of the variable to which it applies No flow in line
LESS Quantitative reduction Less flow
MOR Quantitative i crease Higher temperature
OTHER Partial or total replacement Other su stances were a ded
INVERSE Opposit funct on to d sign intention Return flow
PART OF Qualitative decline. Only part of whatshould happen occurs
Part of volume required by recipe
was added
IN ADDITION Qualitative increase. More is producedthan intended
In addition of the amount of water
of the process was added
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3.2. Fault Tree Analysis
FTA is a technique to identify and analyse factors that may contribute to an unwanted specified
event (called the “top or main event”). Causal effects are identified deductively and organised
in a logical manner and shown using a tree diagram that describes the causal factors and their logical
relationships (Table 2) with respect to the top event.
Table 2. Symbols used in fault trees. Source: ISO 31.010:2011 [27] and Vesely et al. [37].
Symbol Meaning Description
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A fault tree can be used qualitatively to identify potential causes and the ways in which failure 
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The stages for the application of this technique are: 
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modes are established and it is possible to identify how these failures can occur at basic levels or 
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evaluation enables a complete risk analysis before implementing and prioritising actions to 
improve the safety and reliability of the system under study. A complementary sensitivity 
analysis can be performed to check the effect of the basic events in the global risk assessment. 
These data allow prioritizing the preventive measures and the efforts of the risk control process. 
4. Application to a Case Study: The Chemical Terminal at the Port of Valencia
The application of the methodology is performed for the jetty and pipe work of the chemical 
terminal, as well as the connected storage facilities, at the Port of Valencia. These storage facilities are 
owned by two companies: Terminales Portuarias SL (TEPSA) and Petróleos de Valencia SA 
(PTROVAL) [38,39]. Both companies work in the reception, storage, loading, and distribution of 
liquid products—divided into two groups: chemicals and oil. 
4.1. Identification of Products Handled 
TEPSA stores and distributes gasoline, diesel, methanol, and other chemicals in smaller 
amounts. PTROVAL (owned by Galp Energía) stores and distributes gasoline, diesel, and kerosene. 
The four substances (petrol, diesel, methanol, and kerosene) are hazardous substances according to 
Schedule I of Royal Decree 1254/1999 [40] and the large volumes handled mean that the plant is 
considered high risk under the Seveso classification. Such high-risk plants are required to conduct a 
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Intermediate event A f ult event hat occurs because of one or more antecedentscauses acting through logic gates
A fault tree ca be used qualita ively to identi y potential uses and the ways in which failure
(the top event) occurs or quantitatively, or both, to calculate the probability of the top event from
the probabilities of causal events.
The stages for the application of this technique are:
(1) Define the top ven .
(2) Construction of the f ult tree: From the t p event, the possible immediate causes of the failure
modes are est blished and it is possible to iden ify how these failur s can occur at basic levels or
in basic events.
(3) Quali ative evaluation: The aim to find the minimum set of faults, establishing a mathematical
formulation from the relationships established in the fault tree. To achieve this, the “OR” gates
are repla ed by the “+” sig (not additio but a union of conjunctions) and the gates “AND” by
the “x” sign (equivalent to the intersection of conjunctions). Boolean algebra is used.
(4) Quantitative evaluation: From the frequency of failure of basic events, the probable frequency
of an accident is calculated (if it occurs) as well as the most critical fault routes (i.e., the most
probable among combinations of susceptible events that may cause the top event). Quantitative
evaluation enables a complete risk analysis before implementing and prioritising actions to
improve the safety and reliability of the system under study. A complementary sensitivity
analysis can be performed to check the effect of the basic events in the global risk assessment.
These data allow prioritizing the preventive measures and the efforts of the risk control process.
4. Application to a Case Study: The Chemical Terminal at the Port of Valencia
The application of the methodolog is p rformed for the jetty and pipe work of the chemical
t rmi al, as well as the connected storage faciliti s, at the Port of Valencia. These storage facilities
a e owned by two companies: Terminal s Portuarias SL (TEPSA) and Petróle s de Valencia SA
(PTROVAL) [38,39]. Both companies work in the reception, storage, loading, and distribution of liquid
products—divid d into two groups: chemical and oil.
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4.1. Identification of Products Handled
TEPSA stores and distributes gasoline, diesel, methanol, and other chemicals in smaller amounts.
PTROVAL (owned by Galp Energía) stores and distributes gasoline, diesel, and kerosene. The four
substances (petrol, diesel, methanol, and kerosene) are hazardous substances according to Schedule I
of Royal Decree 1254/1999 [40] and the large volumes handled mean that the plant is considered high
risk under the Seveso classification. Such high-risk plants are required to conduct a risk analysis.
4.2. Historical Analysis of Accidents
Chang et al. [41] performed a study of storage tank accidents in industrial facilities between 1960
and 2003. They collected and reviewed 242 tank accidents, 207 belonging to crude oil, oil products
(fuel oil, diesel, kerosene, lubricants), gasoline/naphtha and petrochemicals products. The main causes
of tanks accidents were in order of importance: lightning (33.1%), maintenance (13.2%), operational
error (12.0%), equipment failure (7.9%), sabotage (7.4%), crack/rupture (7.0%), leaks and line rupture
(6.2%) and static electricity (3.3%).
Person and Lönnermark [10] listed 479 fires involving hydrocarbon storage tanks between 1951
and 2003. Based on this work, Hailwood et al. [11] identified 21 tank explosions followed by a fire.
In a specific study of risk assessment for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, Aneziris et al. [42]
identified the initiating events of accidents of LNG terminals. They divided the LNG terminals
in five areas: LNG tanks, unloading section (from ship to tank), send-out section, condenser and
outlet pipeline.
In tanks section, the main initiating events are boil-off removal malfunction (during unloading
or during storage), a high temperature in LNG (when coming from ship), an excess of external
heat in storage tank area, an overfilling of the tank, a rollover during unloading or during storage,
an inadvertent starting of additional compressors, a continuation of uploading beyond lower safety
level and an increase of send out rate from tank. In unloading section, the main initiating events
are an excess external heat in jetty area, a water hammer in loading arm (due to inadvertent valve
closure), an inadequate cooling of lading arm and high winds during uploading.
In Appendix A, a list of well documented past accidents has been extracted from reports and
works available in the literature. The list includes accidents in petroleum and LNG product storage
facilities [12,13,43,44].
The origins of these accidents were leaks or spills (9), explosions (7) and fire (6). Leakage
(in the form of liquid) is the most common source of major accidents—leading to fires and explosions
that may cause other leaks, thus lengthening the accidental chain. The possible consequences of
leakage depend on the flammability and toxicity of the leaked liquids and the environmental conditions
in which the leak occurs.
Seventeen of the cases originated in storage tanks, two in tanker ships, one in pipes, one in a steam
boiler of a LNG plant and in one case there was no specific origin.
Factors that may cause an accident are grouped into general and specific. Among the general
causes are those that are: external to the plant, human behaviour, mechanical failure, failure caused by
impact, violent reactions; instrumentation failure, and failure of services. These general causes include
a number of specific causes provided by details of specific accidents. Note that a single accident
can occur for more than one general cause, and a general cause may be the result of more than one
specific cause. The recorded data on the general causes of accidents shows that the cause was human
behaviour in ten cases, instrumentation failure on four occasions, electrostatic spark on two occasions,
mechanical failure in two occasions, unknown causes on two occasions, and two accidents were caused
respectively by mechanical impact failure and external causes respectively.
Ignition sources provided the energy needed for the combustion of a flammable mixture.
These sources can be thermal, electrical, mechanical and chemical. Data shows that in seven accidents
the cause was electrical, in three the cause was welding during maintenance works, mechanical in three
cases, thermal in two cases, and unknown in seven cases.
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4.3. HAZOP Analysis
The Valencian plant is divided into three systems (Figure 3) that correspond to the three activities
of the companies: unloading, storage, and loading for distribution.
These three systems are divided into six sub-systems and these again are divided into specific
points or nodes that correspond to the sequence of operational steps in the plant (Table 3). Table 4
shows guide words and parameters used in the HAZOP analysis and Table 5 shows the result of
the HAZOP analysis for node 2.1.1 (opening tank valves) and some variables of node 2.1.2 (filling tank).Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2017, 14, 705  8 of 27 
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s a result of this analysis, it can be seen that, in the areas for loading and unloading liquid
products (Systems 1 and 3), the greatest danger is the possibility of an uncontrolled spill. The occurrence
of this event is closely linked to the effectiveness of the staff responsible for handling the tasks.
Relative to System 2, the risk of a fuel loss in the pipelines and leakage or fuel loss in the storage tanks
is noteworthy. The latter event could be caused by overfilling or a partial rupture of the tank. Special
attention must be given to such events because they can cause fires and explosions that may have more
serious consequences for the plant and its staff.




1.1.1 Docking ship at terminal
1.1.2 Extension of marine loading arm
1.1.3 Joining of marine arm and manifold
1.2 Transfer to tanks
1.2.1 Opening of valves
1.2.2 Product movement
1.2.3 Closure of valves
1.2.4 Cleaning of tubes
2 Storage of productin tanks
2.1 Filling tanks
2.1.1 Opening tank valves
2.1.2 Filling tank
2.1.3 Closing tank valves
2.2 Product storage 2.2.1 Product storage
3 Loading product
in tank truck
3.1 Arrival at loading
station
3.1.1 Positioning of tank truck
3.1.2 Flexible hose connection to tank truck
3.2 Transfer from
tanks
3.2.1 Opening tank truck valves
3.2.2 Transfer and filling of tank
3.2.3 Valve closure
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Table 4. Guide Words and Parameters used in the HAZOP analysis.













2.1.2 More/More Level/Static electricity
2.1.3 Yes/More/More-Less/More/More Flow/Speed/Pressure/StaticElectricity/Corrosion




Entry into the loading





3.2.2 More/No/Yes/More/Less Level/Connection/Stop filled/StaticElectricity/Safety
3.2.3 Yes /More/More-Less/More/More Flow/Speed/Pressure/StaticElectricity/Corrosion
ID: Identity.
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Table 5. Example of HAZOP analysis for nodes 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
Node 2.1.1: Tank Opening Valves System 2: Product Storage in Tank
Sub-System 2.1: Filling Tank
Guide Word Variable Deviation Possible Causes Possible Consequences Comments and Corrective Measures
More Static electricity Accumulation of staticelectricity than expected
Circulation of liquid in the valve.
Bad earth grounding.
Possible risk of explosion if
difference in electrical
potential occur.
The faster the speed of flow, the greater
charge generated.
Valves and flanges that are completely painted
should be conductively bridged and earthed.
More Corrosion More corrosion of materialsthan expected
Exposure to corrosive
environment.
Attack of impurities at points
with imperfections or fatigue.
Lack of maintenance.
Uniform deterioration of surface of
valve (general corrosion).
Reduction in the useful life
(weakening).
The best way to avoid corrosion is to select
the most resistant alloy for the valve– depending
on the corrosive nature of the fluids.
When damage is minor and possible to repair
the body of the valve—at least
provisionally—with a metal weld or with epoxy
resin (for low pressures and temperatures).
Node 2.1.2: Filling Tank System 2: Product Storage in Tank
Sub-System 2.1: Filling Tank
Guide Word Variable Deviation Possible Causes Possible Consequences Comments and Corrective Measures






Spill of liquid down external
tank walls.
Formation of inflammable
atmosphere as fuel hits floor.
If source of ignition exists there is
serious risk of explosion and/or
pool fire with chain reaction to
affect nearby tanks.
Activate tank vents to reduce or stop emissions
of vapour.
Staff training.
Renewal of level sensors.
Verification of state of all valves.
Automatic level alarms as operator activated
redundant safety devices.
Use of indicators that measure volume to avoid
confusion with specific weight.
Spill containment berm system should have
a capacity greater than the tanks (including
safety percentage).
More Static electricity Accumulation of staticelectricity than expected
Liquid projected by jet.
Liquid enters tank being filled.
Movement of liquid in tank
causing turbulence
and splashing.
Production of electrostatic sparks
with sufficient energy to
cause ignition.
Generation of extremely serious
fires and/or explosions.
As a safety measure, it is recommended that
the filling tube is always below the liquid surface
level (meaning that it reaches the floor), or if not
possible, the flow should be reduced.
Fluids should slide along the walls of tanks so that
charges can dissipate through the earthed
protective coverings.
Speed of fluid should not exceed 7 m/s.
Air humidity should be around 60%.
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4.4. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
By using HAZOP analysis, four events were extracted for analysis using the fault tree technique.
These events or top events were:
 Top event (1): Fuel spill in ship-terminal unloading area.
 Top event (2): Fuel leak in pipelines.
 Top event (3): Fuel spill in storage tank.
 Top event (4): Fuel spill in tank truck loading area.
The faults and relationships for each top event have been identified and a logical combination
of incidents has been deduced that can trigger unwanted events. In this way, each tree contains
information about how the combination of certain faults leads to overall failure (Figure 4). Appendix B
presents the fault trees of the other top events.
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Once the fault trees have been made, the mathematical expressions are defined ant the probability
values are calculated according to the Boolean algebra related to FTA (Tables 6 and 7).
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Table 6. Qualitative evaluation of top event (1).
Top Event (1) Fuel Spill Ship-Terminal Unloading Area
Equations System Boolean Equation
A = B + C
A = (3 × 1) + (4 × 1) + (8 × 1) + (9 × 1) + (5 × 2) + (6 × 2) + (7 × 2)
B = D × 1
C = E × 2
D = 3 + 4 + F
E = 5 + 6 + 7
F = 8 + 9
Table 7. Top event failure frequencies (1).
Top Event (1) Fuel Spill in Ship-Terminal Area
Basic Event Description Failure Frequency (year−1)
1 Operator failure 8.8 × 10−2
2 Operator distracted 1.8 × 10−1
3 Ship collision with another in transit 6.0 × 10−4
4 Manoeuvring collision against jetty 3.3 × 10−1
5 Corrosion 4.4 × 10−3
6 Badly connected loading arm 8.8 × 10−1
7 Damaged connection caused by inadequate use 8.8 × 10−2
8 Loading arm damaged by inadequate use 8.8 × 10−2
9 Manufacturing defect 8.8 × 10−3
B Leakage caused by broken loading arm 3.7 × 10−2
C Connection leak 1.7 × 10−1
A = B + C Top event (1) 2.1 × 10−1
From these equations and data on the frequency of failures of basic events, a quantitative
assessment of the trees enables a calculation of the probability of the occurrence of the top event
(year−1). The procedure for calculating the top event (1) is shown in Table 7. In the four analysed
top events, some 19 basic events are defined and fault frequencies were determined using data
from the Spanish National Institute on Health and Safety at Work [45] and research on fuel
storage [12,41,46,47]. In the Appendix C similar tables are developed for the others top events.
In Table 8, the results of failure frequency for each of the top events and their ways of failure
are presented. A column called “Importance” has been added in order to show the importance of
the failure frequency of the events (and also of their ways of failure) developed through the fault tree
technique. The results indicate that the top event (4) “Fuel spill in tank truck loading area” has a failure
rate of 1.7 events/year, i.e., 85% of the events developed through the fault tree technique. There are two
ways a top event (4) can be generated: the first is via a “connection leak” with an importance of 80.28%
and the second is via “leak caused by broken hose” which accounts for 5.02% of importance. If the basic
events are analysed, the main causes for a connection leak are a bad hose connection and a response
failure following the detection of an emergency (incorrect staff response, failure of the acoustic alarm,
or seizure of the manual closure valve).
The next most significant source of risk for the overall failure sequence is “connection leakage”
in the top event (1) “Fuel spill in ship-terminal unloading area” (with a failure frequency of
0.17 events/year). This event occurs following a loss of product (caused by a bad connection of
the loading arm or damaged parts) together with human error. The probability of occurrence is low
since it is one of the most complex operations and involves very strict protocols.
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Table 8. Results of quantitative analysis.
Description Frequency of Failure (year−1) Importance (%)
Top event (1): Fuel spill in ship-terminal unloading area 0.21 10.54
Leakage caused by broken loading arm 0.037 2.00
Connection leak 0.17 8.53
Top event (2): Fuel leak in pipelines 0.0081 0.41
Breakage caused by cracking 0.0061 0.31
Undetected leak 0.0020 0.10
Top event (3): Leak in storage tank 0.075 3.76
Overfilling 0.063 3.16
Loss of leak tightness 0.012 0.60
Top event (4): Fuel spill in tank truck loading area 1.7 85.29
Leak caused by broken hose 0.085 5.02
Connection leak 1.6 80.28
A sensitivity analysis has been performed (see Appendix D) in order to check the effect of the basic
events in the global risk assessment. In the top event (1) (Table 9 and Figure 5), the basics events with
more influence in the sequence of the accident are in order of importance: operator distracted, operator
failure, badly connecting loading arm and collision against jetty during manoeuvres. In the top event
(2) are corrosion, operator distracted and with the same importance vehicles collision and fatigue
defect. In the top event (3) are operator failure and with equal importance the failure of the sensor level
and the failure of response of the shut-off valve. In the top event (4) are hose incorrectly connected,
after with equal importance, the acoustic signal failure and the sticking of the manual shut-off valve,
and in the fourth level the operator failures. These results show the importance in all the sequences of
accident of the failure or distraction of the operators, so it should be mandatory a plan for training
the staff of the plants. Planning of the maintenance actions of the facility must take into account both
the general results from the risk assessment and the results from the sensitivity analysis.
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Table 9. Sensitivity Analysis for the Top event (1).
Top Event (1) Fuel Spill Ship-Terminal Unloading Area
Equations System A = B + C = (3 × 1) + (4 × 1) + (8 × 1) + (9 × 1) + (5 × 2) + (6 × 2) + (7 × 2)
Event 1 B C A Event 2 B C A
0.1077 0.0460 0.1698 0.2158 0.1953 0.0375 0.1892 0.2266
0.1027 0.0439 0.1698 0.2137 0.1903 0.0375 0.1843 0.2218
0.0977 0.0417 0.1698 0.2115 0.1853 0.0375 0.1795 0.2170
0.0927 0.0396 0.1698 0.2094 0.1803 0.0375 0.1747 0.2121
0.0877 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.1753 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0827 0.0353 0.1698 0.2051 0.1703 0.0375 0.1650 0.2024
0.0777 0.0332 0.1698 0.2030 0.1653 0.0375 0.1601 0.1976
0.0727 0.0310 0.1698 0.2009 0.1603 0.0375 0.1553 0.1927
0.0677 0.0289 0.1698 0.1987 0.1553 0.0375 0.1504 0.1879
Event 3 B C A Event 4 B C A
0.0008 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.3502 0.0392 0.1698 0.2090
0.0008 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.3452 0.0388 0.1698 0.2086
0.0007 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.3402 0.0383 0.1698 0.2081
0.0007 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.3352 0.0379 0.1698 0.2077
0.0006 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.3302 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0006 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073 0.3252 0.0370 0.1698 0.2068
0.0005 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073 0.3202 0.0366 0.1698 0.2064
0.0005 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073 0.3152 0.0361 0.1698 0.2060
0.0004 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073 0.3102 0.0357 0.1698 0.2055
Event 5 B C A Event 6 B C A
0.0046 0.0375 0.1699 0.2073 0.8966 0.0375 0.1733 0.2108
0.0045 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.8916 0.0375 0.1724 0.2099
0.0045 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.8866 0.0375 0.1716 0.2090
0.0044 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.8816 0.0375 0.1707 0.2081
0.0044 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.8766 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0043 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.8716 0.0375 0.1689 0.2064
0.0043 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.8666 0.0375 0.1681 0.2055
0.0042 0.0375 0.1698 0.2072 0.8616 0.0375 0.1672 0.2046
0.0042 0.0375 0.1698 0.2072 0.8566 0.0375 0.1663 0.2038
Event 7 B C A Event 8 B C A
0.0897 0.0375 0.1702 0.2076 0.0897 0.0376 0.1698 0.2074
0.0892 0.0375 0.1701 0.2075 0.0892 0.0376 0.1698 0.2074
0.0887 0.0375 0.1700 0.2074 0.0887 0.0375 0.1698 0.2074
0.0882 0.0375 0.1699 0.2074 0.0882 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0877 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073 0.0877 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0872 0.0375 0.1697 0.2072 0.0872 0.0374 0.1698 0.2072
0.0867 0.0375 0.1696 0.2071 0.0867 0.0374 0.1698 0.2072
0.0862 0.0375 0.1696 0.2070 0.0862 0.0373 0.1698 0.2071
0.0857 0.0375 0.1695 0.2069 0.0857 0.0373 0.1698 0.2071
Event 9 B C A
0.0090 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0089 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0089 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0088 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0088 0.0375 0.1698 0.2073
0.0087 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073
0.0087 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073
0.0086 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073
0.0086 0.0374 0.1698 0.2073
5. Conclusions
In this paper, a methodology that combines HAZOP analysis and FTA is used. HAZOP analysis
identifies the risks and their possible causes and consequences. FTA, based on the HAZOP analysis,
represents the fault propagation pathways and produces a qualitative and quantitative assessment
of the sequences of events that can lead to accidents or serious failures. Results from FTA allow
prioritizing the preventive and corrective measures in order to minimize the probability of failure.
An analysis of case study about a fuel storage terminal is performed. HAZOP analysis shows that
loading and unloading areas are the most sensitive areas of the plant and where the most significant
danger is a fuel spill—tasks that can produce such an event are closely supervised by staff. Tasks related
to transferring fuel from ships to tanks and storage tanks are the most automated and so the influence of
personnel is reduced—although the consequences are more serious if an accident occurs. FTA analysis
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2017, 14, 705 15 of 26
indicates that the most likely event is “Fuel spill in tank truck loading area” and the sequence of
events that would most likely cause such an event is a “connection leakage” caused by improper
hose connection and a failure of emergency systems. A sensitivity analysis of the FTA results shows
the importance of the human behaviour in all sequences of the possible accidents. A slight increase or
decrease of the frequency of failure of human operations generate an important increase or decrease,
respectively, of the frequency of failure of the top event, so corporation’s prevention plans must
increase the training of the staff, develop of automatic control measures and develop or improve
control procedures to check the human operations.
In future research, we will apply a similar analysis to other type of plant, as LNG plants or storage
of chemical products at a process plant, in order to improve the use of the combined method and to
compare results from the risk assessments. In this way, we will build a database of HAZOP cases and
FTA analysis and could improve the maintenance plans of the various types of plants.
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Appendix A. Historical Analysis of Accidents




2010 Burosse-Mendousse(France) [44] Oil Explosion
Explosion of a tank of 1400 m3 containing crude oil. The roof
was ejected several meters away and the tank’s base slightly lifted.
The most probable ignition source is an electrostatic discharge.
2009 Bayamón (PuertoRico) [43]
Gasoline, Diesel,
Kerosene Spill
In the plant of the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (a storage,
distribution, and fuel blending service) the failure of the sensor
system for filling a gas tank caused a fuel spill that triggered a series
of explosions and fires. The disaster affected 18 tanks, destroyed 50%
of the plant, and caused considerable damage to the environment
and the local area.
2007 Sløvâg (Norway)[44] Gasoline Fire
Accident took in the facilities of company Vest Tank AS, on the
Sløvâg industrial area. The first explosion took place in a tank where
the base–shell weld ruptured and the upper part of the tank was
launched up in the air and landed in the north-eastern corner of Tank
Farm II. Subsequent explosions and fires destroyed the other tank
farm. There were no casualties in the accident. This accident
occurred during purification of coker gasoline (reduction of the
content of mercaptans). The investigation found that addition of
hydrochloric acid during the process reduced the solubility of
mercaptans in the solution, leading to the build-up of a flammable
mixture. Air filter with activated carbon placed on the roof absorbed
mercaptans, leading to a self-ignition and the explosion.
2006 Spoleto (Italy) [43] Oil Explosion
An explosion occurred at Umbria Oil plant near Spoleto, Italy,
when five workers were welding a structure on the roofs of several
tanks. Firstly, one tank containing raw pomace oil exploded, rising
up of about 10 m. This first explosion led to a pool fire that spread
in the tanks’ park. One hour later, two other tanks exploded, with
rupture of the bottom welding, ejecting missiles of 10 tons 80 m away
near warehouses storing by-products and packaging materials.
Four workers lost their life in this accident.
2006 Partridge-Raleigh(USA) [44] Petroleum Explosion
The explosion at Partridge-Raleigh Oilfield was caused by sparks of
the welding of pipes that joined tanks. Three workers died and other
suffered serious injuries.
2005 Hertfordshire(England) [13,43] Gasoline Spill
In the storage terminal known as “Buncefield depot” 300 tons of
gasoline overflowed in a storage tank because of a high-level device
failure and the failure of safety device that close the filling valves and
raise the alarm. Fire broke out when the gasoline vapour cloud
ignited. The ignition source may have been a backup generator,
or a spark produced by a vehicle. In total, 20 storage tanks
(containing 13.5 million litres each) burned for several days.
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas.





2004 Skikda (Algeria)[42] LNG Explosion
The steam boiler of the LNG production plant exploded, triggering
a second, more massive vapour-cloud explosion and fire.
The explosions and fire destroyed a portion of the LNG plant and
caused 27 deaths, 74 injuries, and material damage outside the
plant’s boundaries.
2003 Puertollano (Spain)[10] Naphta Explosion
An explosion in a naphtha tank in the refinery resulted in an intense
fire that spread to six other tanks containing 8600 m3 of gasoline.
2003 Oklahoma (USA)[44] Diesel Explosion
In a Conoco-Phillips plant a diesel tank exploded with 900 m3 of fuel,
triggering a fire that involved three other liquid fuel storage tanks.
The cause of the incident was the generation of a volatile mix inside
the tank after it was emptied. The likely source of ignition
was an electrical discharge from a nearby line.
2001 Kansas (USA)[10,12] Crude petroleum Fire
A worker who was checking the level of oil in a storage tank at night
lit a match. The flame ignited vapours and caused a huge explosion.
2000 Hampshire (UnitedKingdom) [10] Crude petroleum Leak
A crack in the bottom of a storage tank of crude oil (caused by
corrosion) caused a catastrophic spill of crude oil.
1997 Ashdod (Israel) [12] Gasoil Leak
In the tank farm of Ashdod Oil Refinery the explosion of a 15,000 m2
gasoil tank caused loss of one worker. The investigation concluded
that a non-complete gasoil stripping with hydrogen at the exit of
gasoil hydro treating unit caused penetration of hydrogen inside
the tank. The source of ignition was most likely electrostatic spark
initiated by synthetic rope used to get samples out the tank.
1995 Rouseville (USA)[44] Wastewater Tank Explosion
During a welding operation near the wastewater tank that contained
a layer of flammable liquid, sparks ignited flammable vapours at
openings in the tank. The deflagration caused the tank to fail at
the bottom seam and shoot into the air. Five workers died and fire
ignited other tanks and caused loud explosions.
1993 Port of Tarragona(Spain) [12]
Naphta, fuel oil
and crude oil Fire
A Danish petroleum tanker with 22,000 tons of naphtha on board
collided with the REPSOL wharf in Tarragona during docking.
The collision broke three pipes on the wharf containing naphtha,
fuel oil, and crude oil—fire quickly broke out and produced a thick
smoke. The combustion wastes contaminated nearby beaches.
REPSOL estimated that damage to the wharf totalled the equivalent
of €18 million.
1988 Santander (Spain)[12] Diesel Fire
A fire started during cleaning operations in an empty oil tank at




A fire started in an enlarged Shell terminal holding up to 43,000 m3
of Class B oil products (gasoline and kerosene among others) and
Class D products (asphalt). Nearly 7000 m3 of products were burned,
two people dead, and 16 were seriously injured. The causes are
unknown, although it is known that changes were being made to
the wiring system.
1986 Thessaloniki(Greece) [41] Fuel-oil Leak
A fire caused by a fuel oil leak in an ESSO Pappas terminal set 10 of
the 12 storage tanks ablaze. The fire lasted eight days, extended over
75% of the total area of the terminal, and destroyed the stationary
fire-fighting system, as well as the systems controlling pumps and
loading. The fire started during maintenance work after a leak
in a tank went undetected.
1985 Port of Naples(Italy) [41,43] Gasoline Spill
At an AGIP plant a cloud of gasoline vapour exploded and damaged
nearby houses. Windows broke up to 600 meters away. Tanks of
gasoline, kerosene, and diesel were set on fire. The incident resulted
in four deaths and 170 injuries. Twenty-four of the 32 storage tanks
were affected. The probable cause was an accident when unloading
a ship or a storage tank overflow.
1983 New Jersey (USA)[41] Gasoline Spill
An overfilled floating roof tank spilled 1300 barrels of gasoline.
The resulting explosion destroyed two storage tanks and
a neighbouring terminal. A cloud of vapour was blown to a nearby






In the river port area, a fire started in the storage area with 24 diesel
and fuel oil storage tanks of between 1500 and 4700 m3 capacity.





A fire broke out in a plant with eight large tanks of petroleum
products. Two of the gasoline storage tanks caught fire as well as
various tanks containing additives. All stocks of foam within 90 km
were used. The origin was a leak from a gasoline tank that produced
a cloud of vapour which travelled about 220 m and came into contact
with a water heater in a nearby yard.
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas.
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Table A4. Qualitative evaluation of top event (3).
Top Event (3) Leak in Storage Tank
Equations System Boolean Equation
A = B + C
A = (2 × 1) + (3 × 1) + (4 × 1) + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9
B = D × 1
C = E + F
D = 2 + 3 + 4
E = 5 + 6
F = 7 + 8 + 9
Table A5. Top event failure frequencies (3).
Top Event (3) Leak in Storage Tank
Basic Event Description Failure Frequency (year−1)
1 Operator failure 8.8 × 10−2
2 Sensor level failure 4.1 × 10−1
3 Valve shut-off response failure 2.2 × 10−1
4 Acoustic signal failure 8.8 × 10−2
5 Reinforcement breaking 2.2 × 10−3
6 Tank breaking 2.2 × 10−3
7 Corrosion 4.4 × 10−3
8 Insufficient revisions 1.8 × 10−3
9 Operator failure 1.8 × 10−3
F Crack formation leak 8.0 × 10−3
E Catastrophic tank rupture 4.4 × 10−3
D Level control failure 7.2 × 10−1
C Loss of leak tightness 1.2 × 10−2
B Overfilling 6.3 × 10−2
A = B + C Top event (3) 7.5 × 10−2
Table A6. Qualitative evaluation of top event (4).
Top Event (4) Fuel Spill in Tank Truck Loading Area
Equations System Boolean Equation
A = B + C
A = (3 × 1) + (4 × 1) + (5 × 1) + (2 × 6) + (2 × 7) + (2 × 8)
B = D × 1
C = 2 × E
D = 3 + 4 + 5
E = 6 + 7 + 8
Table A7. Top event failure frequencies (4).
Top Event (4) Fuel Spill in Tank Truck Loading Area
Basic Event Description Failure Frequency (year−1)
1 Operator failure 8.8 × 10−1
2 Hose incorrectly connected 8.8 × 10−1
3 Collision against hose 8.8 × 10−4
4 Hose defects due to misuse 8.8 × 10−2
5 Manufacturing effects 8.8 × 10−3
6 Incorrect alarm response 8.8 × 10−1
7 Acoustic signal failure 8.8 × 10−1
8 Manual shut-off valve sticking 1.0 × 10−1
E Emergency action failure 1.86 × 100
D Broken Hose 9.7 × 10−2
C Connection leak 1.63 × 100
B Leak caused by broken hose 8.5 × 10−3
A = B + C Top event (4) 1.7 × 100
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Appendix D. Sensitivity Analysis of Results
Table A8. Sensitivity Analysis for the Top event (2).
Top Event (2) Fuel Leak in Pipelines
Equations System A = B + C = (1 + 2 + 3 + (5 × 4) + (6 × 4) + (7 × 4)
Event 1 B C A Event 2 B C A
0.0064 0.0081 0.0020 0.0101 0.0011 0.0063 0.0020 0.0083
0.0059 0.0076 0.0020 0.0096 0.0010 0.0063 0.0020 0.0083
0.0054 0.0071 0.0020 0.0091 0.0010 0.0062 0.0020 0.0082
0.0049 0.0066 0.0020 0.0086 0.0009 0.0062 0.0020 0.0082
0.0044 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.0009 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0039 0.0056 0.0020 0.0076 0.0008 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0034 0.0051 0.0020 0.0071 0.0008 0.0060 0.0020 0.0080
0.0029 0.0046 0.0020 0.0066 0.0007 0.0060 0.0020 0.0080
0.0024 0.0041 0.0020 0.0061 0.0007 0.0059 0.0020 0.0079
Event 3 B C A Event 4 B C A
0.0011 0.0063 0.0020 0.0083 0.0020 0.0061 0.0022 0.0083
0.0010 0.0063 0.0020 0.0083 0.0019 0.0061 0.0022 0.0083
0.0010 0.0062 0.0020 0.0082 0.0019 0.0061 0.0021 0.0082
0.0009 0.0062 0.0020 0.0082 0.0018 0.0061 0.0021 0.0082
0.0009 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.0018 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0008 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.0017 0.0061 0.0019 0.0081
0.0008 0.0060 0.0020 0.0080 0.0017 0.0061 0.0019 0.0080
0.0007 0.0060 0.0020 0.0080 0.0016 0.0061 0.0018 0.0079
0.0007 0.0059 0.0020 0.0079 0.0016 0.0061 0.0018 0.0079
Event 5 B C A Event 6 B C A
0.0432 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8966 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0427 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8916 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0422 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8866 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0417 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8816 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0412 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8766 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0407 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8716 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0402 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8666 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0397 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8616 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.0392 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081 0.8566 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
Event 7 B C A
0.2212 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2207 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2202 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2197 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2192 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2187 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2182 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2177 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
0.2172 0.0061 0.0020 0.0081
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Table A9. Sensitivity Analysis for the Top event (3).
Top Event (3) Leak in Storage Tank
Equations System A = B + C = (2 × 1) + (3 × 1) + (4 × 1) + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9
Event 1 B C A Event 2 B C A
0.1077 0.0774 0.0123 0.0896 0.4320 0.0648 0.0123 0.0770
0.1027 0.0738 0.0123 0.0860 0.4270 0.0643 0.0123 0.0766
0.0977 0.0702 0.0123 0.0825 0.4220 0.0639 0.0123 0.0761
0.0927 0.0666 0.0123 0.0789 0.4170 0.0634 0.0123 0.0757
0.0877 0.0630 0.0123 0.0753 0.4120 0.0630 0.0123 0.0753
0.0827 0.0594 0.0123 0.0717 0.4070 0.0626 0.0123 0.0748
0.0777 0.0558 0.0123 0.0681 0.4020 0.0621 0.0123 0.0744
0.0727 0.0522 0.0123 0.0645 0.3970 0.0617 0.0123 0.0740
0.0677 0.0486 0.0123 0.0609 0.3920 0.0613 0.0123 0.0735
Event 3 B C A Event 4 B C A
0.2392 0.0648 0.0123 0.0770 0.0897 0.0632 0.0123 0.0754
0.2342 0.0643 0.0123 0.0766 0.0892 0.0631 0.0123 0.0754
0.2292 0.0639 0.0123 0.0761 0.0887 0.0631 0.0123 0.0754
0.2242 0.0634 0.0123 0.0757 0.0882 0.0631 0.0123 0.0753
0.2192 0.0630 0.0123 0.0753 0.0877 0.0630 0.0123 0.0753
0.2142 0.0626 0.0123 0.0748 0.0872 0.0630 0.0123 0.0752
0.2092 0.0621 0.0123 0.0744 0.0867 0.0629 0.0123 0.0752
0.2042 0.0617 0.0123 0.0740 0.0862 0.0629 0.0123 0.0751
0.1992 0.0613 0.0123 0.0735 0.0857 0.0628 0.0123 0.0751
Event 5 B C A Event 6 B C A
0.00239 0.0630 0.01246 0.07547 0.0024 0.0630 0.01246 0.07547
0.00234 0.0630 0.01241 0.07542 0.0023 0.0630 0.01241 0.07542
0.00229 0.0630 0.01236 0.07537 0.0023 0.0630 0.01236 0.07537
0.00224 0.0630 0.01231 0.07532 0.0022 0.0630 0.01231 0.07532
0.00219 0.0630 0.01226 0.07527 0.0022 0.0630 0.01226 0.07527
0.00214 0.0630 0.01221 0.07522 0.0021 0.0630 0.01221 0.07522
0.00209 0.0630 0.01216 0.07517 0.0021 0.0630 0.01216 0.07517
0.00204 0.0630 0.01211 0.07512 0.0020 0.0630 0.01211 0.07512
0.00199 0.0630 0.01206 0.07507 0.0020 0.0630 0.01206 0.07507
Event 7 B C A Event 8 B C A
0.00457 0.0630 0.01246 0.07547 0.00195 0.0630 0.01246 0.07547
0.00452 0.0630 0.01241 0.07542 0.00190 0.0630 0.01241 0.07542
0.00447 0.0630 0.01236 0.07537 0.00185 0.0630 0.01236 0.07537
0.00442 0.0630 0.01231 0.07532 0.00180 0.0630 0.01231 0.07532
0.00437 0.0630 0.01226 0.07527 0.00175 0.0630 0.01226 0.07527
0.00432 0.0630 0.01221 0.07522 0.00170 0.0630 0.01221 0.07522
0.00427 0.0630 0.01216 0.07517 0.00165 0.0630 0.01216 0.07517
0.00422 0.0630 0.01211 0.07512 0.00160 0.0630 0.01211 0.07512
0.00417 0.0630 0.01206 0.07507 0.00155 0.0630 0.01206 0.07507
Event 9 B C A
0.00195 0.0630 0.01246 0.07547
0.00190 0.0630 0.01241 0.07542
0.00185 0.0630 0.01236 0.07537
0.00180 0.0630 0.01231 0.07532
0.00175 0.0630 0.01226 0.07527
0.00170 0.0630 0.01221 0.07522
0.00165 0.0630 0.01216 0.07517
0.00160 0.0630 0.01211 0.07512
0.00155 0.0630 0.01206 0.07507
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Table A10. Sensitivity Analysis for the Top event (4).
Top Event (4) Fuel Spill in Tank Truck Loading Area
Equations System A = B + C = (3 × 1) + (4 × 1) + (5 × 1) + (2 × 6) + (2 × 7) + (2 × 8)
Event 1 B C A Event 2 B C A
0.8966 0.0872 1.6246 1.7118 0.8966 0.0853 1.6616 1.7469
0.8916 0.0868 1.6246 1.7113 0.8916 0.0853 1.6524 1.7377
0.8866 0.0863 1.6246 1.7108 0.8866 0.0853 1.6431 1.7284
0.8816 0.0858 1.6246 1.7104 0.8816 0.0853 1.6338 1.7191
0.8766 0.0853 1.6246 1.7099 0.8766 0.0853 1.6246 1.7099
0.8716 0.0848 1.6246 1.7094 0.8716 0.0853 1.6153 1.7006
0.8666 0.0843 1.6246 1.7089 0.8666 0.0853 1.6060 1.6913
0.8616 0.0838 1.6246 1.7084 0.8616 0.0853 1.5968 1.6821
0.8566 0.0833 1.6246 1.7079 0.8566 0.0853 1.5875 1.6728
Event 3 B C A Event 4 B C A
0.00090 0.08531 1.6246 1.70989 0.0897 0.0870 1.6246 1.7116
0.00089 0.08531 1.6246 1.70988 0.0892 0.0866 1.6246 1.7112
0.00089 0.08530 1.6246 1.70988 0.0887 0.0862 1.6246 1.7107
0.00093 0.08534 1.6246 1.70991 0.0927 0.0897 1.6246 1.7143
0.00088 0.08530 1.6246 1.70987 0.0877 0.0853 1.6246 1.7099
0.00087 0.08529 1.6246 1.70987 0.0872 0.0849 1.6246 1.7094
0.00087 0.08529 1.6246 1.70986 0.0867 0.0844 1.6246 1.7090
0.00086 0.08528 1.6246 1.70986 0.0862 0.0840 1.6246 1.7086
0.00086 0.08528 1.6246 1.70985 0.0857 0.0835 1.6246 1.7081
Event 5 B C A Event 6 B C A
0.0090 0.0855 1.6246 1.7100 0.8966 0.0853 1.6421 1.7274
0.0089 0.0854 1.6246 1.7100 0.8916 0.0853 1.6377 1.7230
0.0089 0.0854 1.6246 1.7100 0.8866 0.0853 1.6333 1.7186
0.0093 0.0857 1.6246 1.7103 0.8816 0.0853 1.6290 1.7143
0.0088 0.0853 1.6246 1.7099 0.8766 0.0853 1.6246 1.7099
0.0083 0.0849 1.6246 1.7094 0.8716 0.0853 1.6202 1.7055
0.0078 0.0844 1.6246 1.7090 0.8666 0.0853 1.6158 1.7011
0.0073 0.0840 1.6246 1.7086 0.8616 0.0853 1.6114 1.6967
0.0068 0.0835 1.6246 1.7081 0.8566 0.0853 1.6070 1.6923
Event 7 B C A Event 8 B C A
0.8966 0.0853 1.6421 1.7274 0.1201 0.0853 1.6421 1.7274
0.8916 0.0853 1.6377 1.7230 0.1151 0.0853 1.6377 1.7230
0.8866 0.0853 1.6333 1.7186 0.1101 0.0853 1.6333 1.7186
0.8816 0.0853 1.6290 1.7143 0.1051 0.0853 1.6290 1.7143
0.8766 0.0853 1.6246 1.7099 0.1001 0.0853 1.6246 1.7099
0.8716 0.0853 1.6202 1.7055 0.0951 0.0853 1.6202 1.7055
0.8666 0.0853 1.6158 1.7011 0.0901 0.0853 1.6158 1.7011
0.8616 0.0853 1.6114 1.6967 0.0851 0.0853 1.6114 1.6967
0.8566 0.0853 1.6070 1.6923 0.0801 0.0853 1.6070 1.6923
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